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Chapters of the Civil Jury
By DouG RENDLEMAN*
The civil jury, though constitutionally protected by the
seventh amendment, has remained a controversial institution
throughout much of Anglo-American legal history. Our roman-
tic ideals are questioned by critics who view the civil jury as
prejudiced and unpredictable; proponents note the sense of
fairness and "earthy wisdom" gained by community participa-
tion in the legal process. This debate surfaces in the process of
accommodation between certain substantive goals of the law
and the pre-verdict and post-verdict procedural devices courts
have employed to control the jury. In this article, Professor
Rendleman examines this conflict in his three "chapters" in-
volving racially motivated discharges of black teachers, defa-
mation of public persons by the news media, and Civil Rights
Act lawsuits before deep south juries. He concludes that "some
actions are suited to jury freedom, others to jury control" de-
pending on the nature of the substantive legal issues and the
competing interests involved.
INTRODUCTION
What is the role of the public in the civil justice process?
This question has concerned jurists for centuries. In much of
the world, the civil jury is rare or extinct. In the United States,
this cumbersome, dilatory, and expensive institution flour-
ishes; the American civil jury is too entrenched in our legal
system to be a fad.
The seventh amendment states that in "suits at common
law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . . ." A commen-
tator has observed that "the amendment's deceptively simple
language belies the countless hours expended in attempts to
ascertain the limits of its applicability."' There is a "federal
policy favoring jury decisions of disputed factual questions. '
2
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
I Lazor, Jury Trial in Employment Discrimination Cases - Constitutionally
Mandated?, 53 TExAS L. REv. 483, 491 (1975).
2 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958).
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The jury, the Supreme Court has said, is "the normal and
preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in civil cases at
law . . . . [A]ny seeming curtailment of the right to a jury
trial should be scrutinzed with the utmost care."
'3
Judges try equitable issues without juries.4 Equitable relief
exists only when the plaintiff's legal remedies are inadequate.
However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the merger of
law and equity, and the Declaratory Judgment Act expanded
legal remedies. The plaintiff may not defeat another party's
right to a jury trial on a legal issue by commencing a lawsuit
in equity. A jury hears and decides factual issues pertaining to
both legal and equitable relief. The judge grants equitable re-
lief commensurate with the jury's fact-finding.5 In recent years,
the Supreme Court has greatly expanded a civil litigant's right
to a jury trial.' The right to a jury trial has been upheld in an
action for trademark infringement and breach of contract seek-
ing damages and an injunction,7 a stockholder's derivative ac-
tion,8 a suit to recover possession of real property,' and a dam-
age action charging discrimination in sale or rental of real prop-
erty.1" This, Justice Stewart said in dissent, represents "an
unarticulated but apparently overpowering bias in favor of jury
trials in civil actions."1
For the right to a jury trial to be realistic, the plaintiff
must evade the defendant's motions intended to halt the law-
suit before it reaches a jury. On the other hand, a backlog of
lawsuits congests court calendars; and jury trials consume time
and money. To prevent useless trials, judges need a pre-trial
device to identify litigants without enough evidence to submit
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1934).
D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 68 (1973); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 338 (1965); Kane, Civil
Jury Trial: The Case for Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4 (1976).
5 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959); Marshall v. Electric
Hose and Rubber Co., 413 F. Supp. 663, 668 (D. Del. 1976).
1 Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality
of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486, 501 (1975).
7 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
8 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
1 Pernell v. Southall Realty Co., 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
20 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 551 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also
Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal
v. Hill, 85 H.Iv. L. REV. 442 (1971).
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to the jury. In modern procedure, summary judgment performs
this function.' 2 When the pleadings reveal an absence of a gen-
uine factual issue, the judge grants summary judgment. The
defendant may obtain summary judgment by negating any es-
sential element of the plaintiff's claim. Summary judgment
does not deprive parties of a jury trial because judges cannot
use it to try issues of fact; they can only determine whether
issues of fact exist.' 3 Despite summary judgment's acceptance,
proponents of jury trials persistently accuse it of treading on
the jury's domain."
Judges possess many tools which permit them to regulate
the jury. Pre-verdict tools include evidentiary rulings, detailed
instructions, and comment on the evidence."5 Post-verdict tools
for regulation of the jury include judgments notwithstanding
the verdict, nonsuits, new trials, and remittitur of damages. In
theory, the .judge uses these devices to guarantee that the jury
follows the legal rules. Judges, the authorities say, adjudicate
legal matters, not issues of fact which are for juries. However,
one question of law for the judge is whether the evidence cre-
ates a factual issue for the jury." Controversy surrounds defin-
ing issues of fact, distinguishing issues of law, deciding whether
to submit a case to the jury, and determining how much evi-
dence will support a jury verdict. In personal injury litigation,
the Supreme Court grants the jury freedom to function freely."
Different types of litigation may require different measures of
control.
Opponents of the civil jury charge that it lacks vision.
They find it parochial, prejudiced, and unpredictable, and
therefore they argue that control mechanisms should be em-
ployed to prevent the jury from deciding questions that would
12 See generally Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis,
83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974).
" 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2712 (1973).
1, First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 353, 304 (1968) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
See generally JAMEs, supra note 4, at §§ 7.12-.22.
Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55
MINN. L. REv. 903, 909-17 (1971).
,1 See, e.g., Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line
R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943). See generally Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65
YALE L.J. 482 (1956).
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be unfavorably influenced by these shortcomings. Even though
"procedural," the civil jury constitutes a significant policy
choice. Judges accommodate the romantic ideal to practical
decision-making and attempt to ameliorate the conflict be-
tween procedural and substantive goals. But as Judge Wisdom
pointed out, "[1]f the history of the jury in Anglo-American
law proves anything, it proves that the civil jury has assumed
many forms and has been circumscribed, circumvented, and
abandoned in various types of cases in many jurisdictions."' 8
Thus courts appear ambivalent about the civil jury. The pur-
pose of this article is to identify the methods courts use to
abandon, circumvent, and circumscribe the jury, to evaluate
the jury's role in modem litigation, and to explain the inevita-
ble tension in this process. The ambivalence toward the civil
jury will be examined through three "chapters" which discuss
some of the principal issues of our time.
I. CHAPTER ONE: BLACK TEACHER DIsCHARGED
As school desegregation progressed in the late 1960's and
the early 1970's, federal courts began to address the problems
of illegally discharged black teachers.' 9 The plaintiffs brought
most desegregation suits in equity seeking injunctive remedies
against school districts as entities. Injunctive relief against fu-
ture segregation, however, may be less than a complete rem-
edy. When a teacher's employment is terminated for racial
reasons, an injunction compelling the defendants to reinstate
the teacher fails to restore the teacher to consistent constitu-
tional treatment. The teacher who lost some salary will seek
reinstatement plus backpay.
In Harkless v. Sweeney Independent School District,0 ten
black former teachers sued school officials and sought rein-
statement with backpay, alleging that their discharges had
been racially motivated. The defendants requested and the
1S Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 409
U.S. 943 (1972).
"1 See Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970).
- 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); accord, McFerren
v. County Bd. of Educ., 455 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972);
Smith v. Hampton Training School, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966).
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district judge granted a jury trial. During voir dire, "for clear
and obvious reasons of strategy," the plaintiffs dismissed all
claims against the defendants in their "individual" capacities
and proceeded against the entity and its officers in their
"official" capacity. The jury found that the officials discharged
the plaintiffs in good faith and without racial motive. The court
of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that neither back-
pay nor reinstatement were appropriate jury issues: "[T]he
prayer for back pay is not a claim for damages, but is an inte-
gral part of the equitable remedy of injunctive reinstate-
ment."2
Sound reasoning supports this result. For the Constitution
to be meaningful, courts must make illegally fired teachers as
whole as judicially possible.22 Partial remedies fail to deter fu-
ture unconstitutional discharges. 23 If a school board actually
discharges a teacher because of the teacher's race, it may be
that a local jury will respond to the same impulses and deny
backpay to the teacher. 24 Distorted or bigoted "factfinding"
might, under the Supreme Court's decisions, also subvert in-
junctive relief. Treating backpay and reinstatement as a uni-
fied equitable remedy permits the judge to award a complete
remedy, the money and employment being equivalent to what
the teacher would have received but for the illegal discharge.
Some scholars consider Harkless to be inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's jury trial decisions.2 When the plaintiff
21 427 F.2d at 324.
22 Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-21 (1975) (stressing back-
pay as necessary to a complete remedy under Title VII); Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d
916, 920 (4th Cir. 1975); Comment, Burton v. Cascade School District: Failure to
Recognize the Need for a Right to Reinstatement Following Unconstitutional Teacher
Dismissal, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 781 (1976).
" Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201, 1207 (4th Cir. 1975) (separate opinion
of Winter, J.); Comment, supra note 22, at 793.
21 Cf. Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738, 748 (S.D. Tex. 1975)
(plaintiffs, because of strategic disadvantages, dismissed charges against individual
school board members and directed their complaint toward the school as an entity);
Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F. Supp. 683, 684 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Redish, supra note 6,
at 503.
2 DOBBS, supra note 4, at 78-79 n.47; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2307 at
46 n.53; Kane, supra note 4, at 30-31. See also Lee Pharm. v. Mishler, 526 F.2d 1115,
1117 (2d Cir. 1975); Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971):
Where there is a claim for money damages which is both legal in nature and
1977]
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claims money damages, it is argued, the defendant may de-
mand a jury trial. 6 While the judge may decide the reinstate-
ment question in equity, a jury should decide the backpay
question." Other commentators, however, defend HarkIess. A
jury, they assert, will favor the official and frustrate the plain-
tiff's relief. Therefore, instead of equating backpay with money
damages, one should analogize it to specific enforcement of a
contract."
Critics of Harkless have also argued that some statutory
actions exclude the right to a jury trial. 2 In Curtis v. Loether,30
however, while specifically declining to pass on Harkless," the
Court held that in a suit seeking damages and injunctive relief
under the Fair Housing Act, either party had a right to a jury
trial on the damage issue. The Court said: "[W]hen Congress
provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an ordinary civil
action in the district courts, where there is obviously no func-
tional justification for denying the jury trial right, a jury trial
must be available if the action involves rights and remedies of
the sort typically enforced in an action at law. '3 2 Jury preju-
dice, actual or potential, is "insufficient to overcome the clear
command of the Seventh Amendment."33
dependent upon the validity of equitable claims, the legal and equitable
issues are common to each other and the parties are entitled to a determina-
tion by a jury of any factual questions related to the equitable issue.
2, Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift
in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L. Rav. 503 (1973); Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201,
1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974), wherein the
Court stated: "We need not, and do not, go so far as to say that any award of monetary
relief must necessarily be 'legal' relief." See also Minnis v. International Union, 531
F.2d 850, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1975); Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir.
1975); SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Cayman Music, Ltd.
v. Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp. 794 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
27 See Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1965); Mitchell v. City Ice Co., 273
F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1960).
21 McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforce-
ment of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 66-70 (1974); Comment,
Monetary Claims Under Section 1983: The Right to Trial by Jury, 8 HARV. CIv. RiGHTS-
Civ. LIB. L. Rv. 613 (1973).
2, Note, Congressional Provision for a Nonjury Trial Under the Seventh
Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401 (1973).
415 U.S. 189 (1974).
Id. at 196-97 n.13.
2 Id. at 195.
Id. at 198.
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It might be argued that housing discrimination is more
nearly a tort and a legal remedy, whereas racial discharge is
more nearly a breach of a contract which can be specifically
enforced in equity. But the actions are really similar; both
vindicate the plaintiffs right to be free from racial slurs and
prejudice.34 Failure to renew a contract on the basis of race may
be unconstitutional, but it is not a breach of contract. The
analogy to specific enforcement either assumes a nonexisting
legal contract or implies a fictional contract.
Backpay may also be viewed as restitution and therefore
equitable. Equitable restitution requires the defendant to dis-
gorge those sums denied the plaintiff which unjustly enrich the
defendant. 5 A racial firing, however, does not unjustly enrich
the school officials at all. Backpay is simply the damage claim
available to any wrongfully discharged employee. 6 Moreover,
courts reject the notion that backpay and reinstatement are
united and hold that they are separate remedies. This permits
a judge, when appropriate, to grant one without the other.
3
1
Treating backpay under Title VII, Justice Rehnquist said
that the right to a jury trial depends on whether a money award
is discretionary or follows automatically from a finding that
defendant violated the substantive standard. If backpay fol-
lows violation "as a matter of course," then it is legal and a jury
issue.38 If the judge retains the responsibility to decide and the
discretion to adjust backpay, then it is equitable and an issue
for the judge. The whole Court should repudiate this novel and
" Pons v. Lorellard, 549 F.2d 950, 954 (4th Cir. 1977); Lazor, supra note 1, at
496-97.
3 Samuel v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991, 994-95 (3d Cir. 1976); DOBBS, supra
note 4, at § 4.1. Cf. SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (govern-
ment action to compel disgorgement).
-1 DOBBS, supra note 4, at 69 n.18; Redish, supra note 6, at 526-28; Lazor, supra
note 1, at 499. But see EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 1975).
11 See Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975) (backpay
granted, reinstatement denied); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del.
1974) (plaintiff reinstated but denied backpay). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-22 (1975) (backpay equitable; standards stated); Comment,
supra note 22.
" Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 443 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring). See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 47, 230-31 (1975). But
see Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974): "[T]he decision whether to award
backpay is committed to the discretion of the trial judge."
1977]
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aberrant view. If the legislature or the adjudicator may affect
a litigant's right to a jury by altering the standards for award-
ing money, then the constitutional right to a jury may be
avoided in every instance by allowing this flexibility. A liti-
gant's right to a jury trial depends on the nature of the issues,
not on the way the issues are decided. Moreover, both law and
equity include remedial discretion. The jury has considerable
discretion over money awards, including punitive damages.39
When liability is close, a jury may compromise and award less
than clearly proven damages." The imprecise rules employed
to measure legal damages allow a jury nearly unlimited discre-
tion.4" If backpay awards are otherwise legal, then neither the
court nor the legislature can make them equitable by granting
additional discretion to the fact-finder.
Therefore, school officials appear to have a seventh
amendment right to a jury trial in a discharged teacher's suit
for backpay. Litigants may not defeat the seventh amendment
by labeling money damages as incidental to equitable relief.
42
If the plaintiff joins a legal claim for backpay with an equitable
claim for reinstatement, the judge should summon a jury to
decide the legal claim and all common factual issues. The
judge may not order reinstatement unless it is consistent with
the jury's finding of fact.43
Judges cannot circumvent defendants' right to a jury trial
on factual issues in actions at common law. Prompt suits and
preliminary injunctions may obviate or decrease backpay
claims.4 Some termination actions hinge on legal questions,
such as whether a statute is constitutional,45 and thus lack a
factual issue for a jury. But many turn on a factual issue:
' DOBBS, supra note 4, at § 3.1.
40 JAMEs, supra note 4, at 320-22.
4, DOBBS, supra note 4, at §§ 3.2, 7.1, and 8.1.
42 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73 (1962); Redish, supra note 6,
at 527-28. But cf. SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (cleanup
doctrine apparently applied in accounting action).
43 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959); Lee Pharm. v. Mishler, 526 F.2d 1115, 1117 (2d
Cir. 1975).
" See, e.g., Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), aft'd, 476 F.2d 375
(8th Cir. 1973).
41 See, e.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975).
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whether officials fired the teacher because the teacher was in-
competent, which is permissible, or because of the teacher's
race, which is impermissible." Discharged teachers may avoid
jury prejudice by seeking only reinstatement and not back-
pay. 7 A judge may avoid jury prejudice by submitting factual
issues to the jury in carefully drafted instructions, directing
verdicts, and granting judgments notwithstanding the verdict
or new trials.48 Perhaps, as Justice Marshall pointed out in
Curtis, jury duty will sensitize jurors to racial problems, raise
their consciousness, and contribute to the education of the
whole society;49 but this will hardly console a disappointed
plaintiff.
The foregoing discussion focuses upon the friction between
procedural and substantive goals, which is the subject of this
article. To achieve a "correct" substantive or constitutional
result, a judge may exclude the publio from the decision-
making process. On the other hand, permitting a jury to follow
its collective impulses may deny plaintiffs their constitutional
rights. Judge Lumbard's dissenting opinion in Burton v. Cas-
cade School District," although not aimed at the jury issue, is
precisely on target.
If community resentment was a legitimate factor to consider,
few Southern school districts would have been integrated.
One of the major purposes of the Constitution is to protect
individuals from the tyranny of the majority. That purpose
would be completely subverted if we allowed the feelings of
the majority to determine the remedies available to a mem-
ber of a minority group who has been the victim of unconsti-
tutional actions.5'
" See, e.g., Adams v. Rankin County Bd. of Educ., 524 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1975);
Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975); Harkless v. Sweeny Ind.
School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Tex. 1975), rev'd 554 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1977).
The reversal on appeal does not alter the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in its original
Harkless Decision at 427 F.2d 319 (1970).
o This is only a half remedy for the illegally discharged, and no remedy at all for
the teacher nearing retirement. It may deprive a judge of remedial flexibility, force
unwanted personal relations on all, and ironically, allow a successful teacher to coerce
a large cash settlement.
" Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974).
" Id.
512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
" Id. at 855-56. See also Kane, supra note 4, at 35 n.144.
1977]
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A black teacher discharged in violation of his constitutional
rights is entitled to be made whole. This cannot be satisfacto-
rily accomplished under existing jury trial doctrine.52
I. CHAPTER Two: NEWS MEDIA LIBELS A PUBLIC PERSON
Defamation law attempts to reconcile conflicting values.
Almost everyone condemns falsity but approves free expres-
sion. At common law, libel was an imposing threat to freedom
of speech. Beginning with New York Times v. Sullivan,53 the
Supreme Court created an immunity or privilege to police the
boundary between protected expression and actionable defa-
mation. Public figures and officials generally cannot recover for
proven defamation concerning matters of public interest or of-
ficial conduct unless they show "malice," i.e., the defendant
knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded truth.54
52 Courts may never have to adjudicate the jury trial question in school cases. That
a school district is a "person" under the Civil Rights Act was a major premise in
Harkless. But two Supreme Court opinions reject the idea that other governmental
entities are Civil Rights Act "persons." City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973);
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). These opinions, as the district court
in Harkless on remand recognized, question the premise of the court of appeals. Hark-
less v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738, 746 (S.D. Tex. 1975). Under the
district court's view, the teacher may sue officials in their official capacity seeking
reinstatement, but a teacher seeking backpay must sue officials in their individual
capacity and surmount a qualified immunity. Id. at 749-51. The present state of law
in the fifth circuit is found in Campbell v. Gadsden County Dist. School Bd., 534 F.2d
650 (5th Cir. 1976), and Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976).
In the fourth circuit, Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975), rests on
an unstated premise that backpay is equitable. Burt holds that a teacher may sue
board members (but not the board) in their official capacity to be reinstated and to
receive back pay without a jury, and a teacher may sue board members in their
individual capacities for reputation or punitive damages, but the defendant has a jury
right and the plaintiff must surmount an immunity barrier. Judge Russell, concurring
in Burt, raises the jury issue. Id. at 1209. See also Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916 (4th
Cir. 1975); Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442, 446-47 (E.D. Va. 1975) (backpay
is "an integral part of the equitable remedy of reinstatement"; immunity defense is
inapplicable to backpay). The jury trial issue will be adjudicated in private employ-
ment cases which are based on statute and lack a government employer. See Marshall
v. Electric Hose and Rubber Co., 413 F. Supp. 663 (D. Del. 1976); Lazor, supra note
1, at 483; Small, Class Actions Under Title VII; Some Current Procedural Problems,
25 Am. U.L. Ray. 821, 851-69 (1976).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51 See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 423 (1974); St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). This chapter deals with the "malice" issue in actions
by public figures and officials. It omits the broadened "private citizen" issue opened
in Gertz. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). While Gertz narrowed the
CHAPTERS OF THE CIVIL JURY
The Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to discard fic-
tional malice, malice inferred from the publication, and the
prudent person test as guides to the defendant's conduct.
Rather, malice is to be determined from whether the defendant
in fact knew the statements were false or recklessly entertained
serious doubts about their truth.55
Dissenting Justices felt that this standard did not suffi-
ciently protect free speech. In Sullivan, Justice Black said that
malice is "an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard
to disprove." This record, he continued, "does not indicate that
any different verdict would have been rendered here whatever
the court had charged the jury about 'malice'. . . or any other
legal formulas. . . ."I' Justice Goldberg stated that the right
to speak about public officials and public affairs "should not
depend upon a probing by the jury of the motivation of the
citizens or press. 5 7 Procedural developments, however, have
weakened the basis for these fears.
Defamation actions serve several purposes. First, if the
plaintiff lost employment or suffered other tangible losses,
damages may compensate. Second, a damage award, in addi-
tion to compensating the plaintiff, may civilize the defendants,
publicly condemn their conduct, and thereby deter others. This
is especially true when the jury awards punitive damages.
Aside from money awards, lawsuits also have symbolic and
educational functions. The plaintiff may be fully but symboli-
cally compensated by an authoritative statement and nominal
damages;"0 moreover, a trial may be a public forum for the
plaintiff to expose the behavior of the defendant."
range of actions in which Sullivan operates, it did not limit Sullivan's scope after the
court finds that the plaintiff is a public figure or official. Commensurate with the
analysis herein, whether a plaintiff is a public official is a question of law for the judge.
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966). This chapter also omits the legal question
of what is defamatory. See National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264
(1974); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 890-96 (2d Cir. 1976).
3 See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
' 376 U.S. 254, 293, 295 (1964).
11 Id. at 298. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 535-37
(1970).
Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 244 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1963) (career destroyed).
5' DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3.9 at 220.
Id. § 3.8 at 191-94; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF ToRTS 468 (1956).
, Cf. Garcia v. Daniel, 490 F.2d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 1974) (purpose of administra-
1977]
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In defamation cases procedural tools are used to reconcile
the competing values. The courts cannot prevent a publicity-
seeking litigant from filing a lawsuit," but a pretrial motion
may prevent a baseless suit from reaching trial. While the
pretrial motion may short-circuit the court system's symbolic
and educational functions, it relieves the defendant from the
burden and uncertainty of defense.13 Since juries have tradi-
tionally favored claimants, 4 courts may expand liability by
allowing more plaintiffs to reach the jury." Conversely, courts
restrict liability by erecting a formidable substantive standard,
granting pretrial motion, and limiting plaintiffs' access to the
jury. The procedural allocation of functions between judge and
jury may be more important to the litigants than the substan-
tive rules the judge applies.
Courts may favor a group or an interest by creating an
absolute immunity like the one that protects judges and execu-
tive officials from defamation actions." A defendant with abso-
lute immunity wins on a pretrial motion. 7 Judge Learned
Hand stated the reason: "[T]o submit all officials, the inno-
cent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the
inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of
all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the
tive hearing was to give plaintiff a chance to clear his name); Wellner v. Minnesota
St. Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 156-57 (8th Cir. 1973) (administrative hearing to
refute charges); G. STERN, THE BunFALo CREEK DISASTER 114, 168, 194, 251, 262 (1976);
Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of
Theatre, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81, 107-13 (1975).
62 Campbell v. New York Evening Post, 245 N.Y. 320, 157 N.E. 153 (1927).
63 Blonder Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
11 Cf. Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (1965)
(judge favors claimant as often as jury but jury awards more money).
65 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 60, § 19.5 at 1081 n.19; R. WENTRAIm, CoMMEN-
TARY ON THE CONFLIcr OF LAwS 204 (1971).
,' Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-
76 (1959). See also Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967) (speech or debate
clause shields Congressmen from both the consequences of litigation and the burdens
of defense).
67 See, e.g., Keeton v. Guerdy, 544 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1976); Lowenschuss v. West
Pub. Co., 542 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1976); Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973);
Berndtson v. Lewis, 465 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1972); Turack v. Guido, 464 F.2d 535 (3d
Cir. 1972); Blum v. Campbell, 355 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Md. 1972); Garcia v. Hilton
Hotels, 97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1951). As a practical matter, an absolute privilege also
blocks discovery.
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unflinching discharge of their duties." 8 Judge Craven applied
the formula: the defendant "is entitled not onl to immunity
from an assessment of damages after trial; he should also be
protected from the harassment, inconvenience and apprehen-
sion inherent in litigation." 9
Sullivan's malice-recklessness standard in public figure
defamation cases appears to create a qualified or conditional
immunity. Generally, when the plaintiff must prove that mal-
ice or recklessness motivated the defendant, the court denies
the defendant's pretrial motions. Decisions construing quali-
fied immunities under federal Civil Rights Acts establish that
the plaintiff can allege enough to avoid a motion to dismiss 0
and may demonstrate factual issues sufficient to avoid sum-
mary judgment.' The trial judge submits the action to a jury
with instructions defining the privilege. 2 In defamation suits,
the defendant realistically fears the delay, expense, and uncer-
tainty of a trial.73 When the court denies defendant's pretrial
motion, the settlement value of the case is increased for the
plaintiff.7
4
While Sullivan's defamation immunity appears to be con-
ditional or qualified, courts frequently employ summary judg-
ment to allow defendants to win before trial. Summary judg-
ment has moved the qualified privilege far in the direction of
an absolute immunity. 5 Before the Court decided Gertz v.
u Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
" Berndtson v. Lewis, 465 F.2d 706, 709 (4th Cir. 1972).
7o Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Gaffney v. Silk, 488 F.2d 1248 (1st Cir.
1973). See Garcia v. Hilton Hotels, 97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1951); The Supreme Court,
1974 Term, supra note 38, at 222-23.
71 See, e.g., Kassman v. American Univ., 546 F.2d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Jones v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
12 Anderson v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 543 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1976); Slocinsky v.
Radwin, 144 A. 787 (N.H. 1929); Campbell v. New York Evening Post, 245 N.Y. 320,
157 N.E. 153 (1927); Creswell v. Pruitt, 239 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
See, e.g., Smoot v. Fox, 353 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1965) ($37,000 expense); Ander-
son, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tax. L. REv. 422, 435-37 (1975).
11 See, e.g., Publisher's Page, EsQumE, November, 1974, at 6 (after court decided
that case must be tried, defendant settled). See also Buckley v. Esquire, Inc., 344 F.
Supp. 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
11 Professor Anderson argues that the Sullivan privilege "operates too late in the
litigation process" and that summary judgment procedure is "an important and useful
step," but he appears to feel that the plaintiff's victory comes too late and that sum-
mary judgment is too little. Anderson, supra note 73, at 436-38, 456-57, 468-69. The
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Welch,76 the Michigan Law Review counted reported defama-
tion decisions and found that defendants won twenty-eight on
summary judgment or pleading motions, four by directed ver-
dicts, two on judgments notwithstanding the verdict, and one
by jury verdict. Appellate courts reversed four plaintiff's ver-
dicts, and only three decisions allowed plaintiff to retain a jury
award. 77 After Gertz, courts continue to decide defamation ac-
tions brought by public persons against media defendants on
pretrial motions in a high percentage of the reported deci-
sions.
7
1
The substantive legal standard may also interact with jury
submission practice and summary judgment to alter the quali-
fied privilege. To prevent the media from censoring itself, the
substantive law permits nonmalicious but damaging errors to
escape redress. The plaintiff has an affirmative duty to show
the defendant's state of mind and must prove that the defen-
dant circulated false information maliciously, knowing that it
was false or with a high degree of awareness that it was proba-
bly false .79 Shortly after the plaintiff files the action, the defen-
dant may move for summary judgment, arguing that there is
no question of fact on the malice issue. The defendant may
accompany the motion with affidavits which deny malice, out-
present author views the summary judgment development as more significant from
both substantive and procedural perspectives.
7- 418 U.S. 423 (1974) (first amendment protection afforded news media against
defamation suits by public persons is not to be extended to defamation suits by private
individuals even though the defamatory statements concern an issue of public or
general interest).
11 Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media from
Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1547,
1565-66 (1972).
11 See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp.
947 (D.D.C. 1976); Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1975); Meeropol v.
Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). After Gertz a clear category of "private
person" actions will be beyond the Sullivan standard. These actions will be less appro-
priate for summary judgment because negligence is less appropriate for summary
judgment. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TExAs L. REv. 422, 456
(1975). No one knows now how large that category is. "Perhaps if attorney Gertz was
not a public figure, no one is." Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1044
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976).
11 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
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line the research process,80 and describe diligent efforts to de-
termine the defamatory statement's source and accuracy.8'
If the defendant moves for summary judgment on the mal-
ice issue with supporting affidavits, the plaintiff must produce
evidence of malice, excuse the failure to do so, or lose.12 The
plaintiff cannot rest on the strength of the allegations.8 3 Unless
the plaintiff produces evidence that defendant proceeded "in
reckless disregard for the truth" or "entertained serious
doubt," the court should grant the defendant's motion.8 4 Con-
clusory charges of malice,85 conjecture, speculation, surmise or
suspicion, 8 simple error which may be due to a misinterpre-
tation," failure to investigate further,8 careless research,89 or
reliance on a previously accurate source" are inadequate to
show malice and do not withstand a motion for summary judg-
ment."
- Perry v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 499 F.2d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 1974);
Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970); Fadell v. Minneapolis
Star and Tribune Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1077-82 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
91 Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 446-48 (S.D. Ga. 1976);
Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 154, 156 (D. Mont. 1973).
1 See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp.
947 (D.D.C. 1976); Louis, supra note 12, at 750.
Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 995 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973); Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 821-22
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
13 Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1336 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (alternative
holding).
Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1052-53 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976).
" Waskow v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Trans World
Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
1 Fadell v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1084-85 (N.D.
Ind. 1976); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947,
959 (D.D.C. 1976); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 446-48
(S.D. Ga. 1976); Otepka v. New York Times Co., 379 F. Supp. 541, 544 (D. Md. 1973);
aff'd, 502 F.2d 1163 (1974); La Bruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 985 (W.D.
Mo. 1973).
0 Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1204-05 (D.D.C. 1975); Alpine
Constr. Co. v. Demaris, 358 F. Supp. 422, 424 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
" Walker v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681, 684 (6th Cir. 1976); Grzelak v. Calumet Pub.
Co., Inc., 543 F.2d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 1975); Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C.
1975); F&J Enterprises, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 292
(N.D. Ohio 1974). See also Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417
F. Supp. 947, 958 (D.D.C. 1976).
11 Of course a "defendant in a defamation action cannot automatically escape
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Thus, courts place a heavy burden on the defamation
plaintiff. Since malice refers to the defendant's knowledge or
the state of his mind, the defendant may have sole access to
the proof. A news reporter's interested, self-serving affidavit
that his mental state while writing the article was not reckless
and that he made an "honest error" is hard to refute. How can
the plaintiff present facts of "possible evidence, either direct
or circumstantial, bearing on [defendant's] thought processes
surrounding the writing of the article"?92
When the court grants the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, on defendant's affidavits the plaintiff loses an
opportunity to cross-examine the defendant. If the court grants
the motion on the strength of the defendant's deposition, the
plaintiff cannot expose the defendant's demeanor before a
judge and jury. Courts solve this problem in similar situations
by denying summary judgment and submitting the issues to a
jury. "We think," said Judge Frank for the majority in
Arnstein v. Porter,13 "that Rule 56 was not designed thus to
foreclose plaintiff's privilege of examining defendant at a trial,
especially as to matters peculiarly within defendant's knowl-
edge."94 In defamation actions, however, many courts respond
differently. They discount the plaintiff's argument that, be-
cause the malice issue concerns the defendant's state of mind
and because the defendant has sole access to the evidence of
malice, a jury should hear the defendant testify. "A plaintiff
is required to offer evidence on the threshold issue of [defen-
dants'] knowledge or doubt [of falsity] and mere speculation
liability by submitting affidavits which attest to the fact that the publication was
made with a belief that the statements therein contained were true." Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.
1977). When the court denies defendant's summary judgment motion, it means one of
two things: "there are questions of fact which preclude granting the motion," or "there
may be questions of fact and I will not grant a motion until the record is more com-
plete." Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 823 (N.D.
Cal. 1977). While we can say that summary judgment has "moved" the qualified
privilege in the direction of absolute immunity, we stop short of saying that it has been
"transformed" into absolute immunity.
92 Kent v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 349 F. Supp. 622, 626 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (plaintiff
might have won under the Gertz standard).
.3 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
" Id. at 471. See also Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464
(1962); Gellhorn & Robinson, Summary Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84
HARV. L. REv. 612, 613-15 (1971).
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and conjecture or the mere chance that on cross-examination
something might be uncovered does not fulfill that require-
ment."95 "That state of mind should generally be a jury issue
does not mean it should always be so in all contexts, especially
where the issue is recklessness, which is ordinarily inferred
from objective facts."9
Summary judgment, Justice Black said, "tempts judges to
take over the jury trial of cases, thus depriving parties of their
constitutional right to trial by jury."9 When dealing with ex-
pression, a judicially favored right, courts may restrict the
jury's power to infer malice. 8 Judges may limit access to the
jury because they consider jurors to be insensitive to first
amendment interests. Courts, in any event, overcome retro-
grade doctrine to award summary judgment to defamation de-
fendants.10
Professor Louis argues that courts should approach all
summary judgment motions by defendants in approximately
the way defamation courts now do.' Interested affidavits ne-
gating an element of the plaintiff's claim should lead to sum-
mary judgment.0 2 State of mind issues should be treated like
any other factual issues: unless the plaintiff has evidence of
defendant's mental state, the court should discount credibility,
demeanor, and the potential of cross-examination." 3 Defama-
tion summary judgment, however, may even exceed Louis' pro-
posals. Courts may deny summary judgment, Louis says, be-
cause "where access to the evidence is unequal, deposition will
often be an inadequate substitute for examination as on cross-
" F&J Enterprises, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 292,
299 (N.D. Ohio 1974). See also Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042,
1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 304 (1968).
Cooper, supra note 16, at 967.
, Monaghan, First Amendment Due Process, 83 HARv. L. REv. 518, 527 (1970).
IN Cervants v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972). The court stated that no
summary judgment unless defendant was entitled "beyond all doubt" and "plaintiff
would not be entitled to recover under any discernible circumstance." Id. at 993.
zo Louis, supra note 12, at 745.
" Id. at 755.
' Id. at 765-66.
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examination of hostile witnesses at trial."'' 4 Yet courts, after
receiving defendants' affidavits denying recklessness, award
summary judgment to defendants even though they have sole
access to the facts.'
0 5
Since the substantive law of defamation hinders a de-
famed plaintiff from recovering money, the injury remains un-
redressed, and the deterrent effect of a damage verdict is
missed. The question is not merely whether the defendant will
win, but increasingly, when the defendant will win. Even un-
successful libel suits, courts say, may have a harassing or chill-
ing effect on the media's willingness to comment."' "Summary
judgment," a court noted, "is particularly appropriate at an
early stage in cases where claims of libel or invasion of privacy
are made against publications dealing with matters of public
interest and concern."'' 0 Because of the defendant's constitu-
tional right, the court independently determines the facts.' 3
Courts award summary judgment to media defendants with
alacrity.'0' Summary judgment saves defendants the time, ex-
pense, and uncertainty of a trial. The plaintiff loses symbolic
vindication in a public forum; and the public loses a trial's
"I1 Id. at 757.
105 See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 822-23 (N.D. Ind.
1976); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947
(D.D.C. 1976).
I"6 Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 954
(D.D.C. 1976); Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 366 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
107 Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"I0 Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1205
(D.D.C. 1975).
I09 See, e.g., Walker v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681, 684 (6th Cir. 1976); Time, Inc. v.
Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 383-84 (4th Cir. 1971); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426
F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 566 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967-68
(D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967) (leading case by Wright, J.); Pierce
v. Capitol City Communications, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976);
Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1975); F&J Enterprises, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 292, 297-98 (N.D. Ohio 1974);
Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071, 1075-76 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam,
449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1971). But see Gordon v. Random House, Inc., 486 F.2d 1356
(3d Cir. 1973); University of the South v. Berkley Pub. Co., 362 F. Supp. 767 (N.D.
Cal. 1973).
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educational experience. The paramount importance of free
expression forces the controversy away from the jury, out of the
courtroom, and into the marketplace of ideas. This is the larger
public benefit. As Judge Carter said, "Because importance of
free speech, summary judgment is the 'rule' and not the excep-
tion, in defamation cases." 10
III. CHAPTER THREE: LAW ENFORCERS OVERREACH A CITIZEN
Directed verdicts for plaintiffs are scarce. They exist"' but
usually in extreme cases."12 To direct a verdict"3 for the plain-
tiff, the judge must find that plaintiff has carried his burden
to the extent that the evidence is insufficient to permit any
different result. The judge must "test the body of evidence not
for its insufficiency to support a finding, but rather for its over-
whelming effect.""' 4 This standard accommodates two conflict-
ing goals: the constitution protects the civil jury; but the judge
must guard the integrity of substantive legal rules."15 Because
the judge can direct a verdict for the plaintiff, a civil jury
cannot subvert substantive law."' But within the scope of its
duty to find facts and apply the law, the jury retains abundant
latitude to circumvent the law."7
This chapter on the civil jury examines four Civil Rights
Act lawsuits tried before deep south juries."' In each suit the
plaintiffs sued local government officials, alleging that the de-
fendants deprived them of constitutional rights under color of
law. The judge submitted each case to the jury on relatively
,' Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
,I 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, at § 2535. But see Cutts v. Casey, 180
S.E.2d 297 (N.C. 1971) (forbidding directed verdict for claimant).
1,2 Knierim v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 424 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1970) (two of defen-
dant's trains collided).
,,3 The term directed verdict as used here includes judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, because a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is technically a delayed ruling
on the motion for a directed verdict.
"I Mihalchak v. Am. Dredging Co., 266 F.2d 875, 877 (3d Cir. 1959). See also
Cooper, supra note 16, at 948.
M, Cooper, supra note 16, at 906-07.
' United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
" Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 816 (1948).
" See also Stewart v. Gilmore, 323 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1963) (common law tort);
Bullock v. Tamiami Trial Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959) (tried by judge).
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clear and undisputed facts. Each jury found for the defendants.
On appeal by the plaintiffs the appellate courts considered
whether the trial judges erred in refusing to direct a verdict for
plaintiffs. '19
In Nesmith v. Alford,"' a white Illinois educator visited
Montgomery, Alabama in March 1960 with his wife and some
students to study nonviolence and the bus boycott. They had
lunch with black people at a cafe in a black neighborhood.
Eating with blacks implies social equality and violated a local
custom.' 21 An unruly crowd gathered in the street outside. The
local officials arrested Nesmith and his group. They were con-
victed of disorderly conduct, but all convictions were later
upset.
The Nesmiths sued local officials in federal district court
charging malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and depri-
vation of the constitutional right to liberty under color of law.
The jury returned a general verdict for defendants. The court
of appeals held that the Nesmiths' simple and peaceful lunch
with Blacks was not a crime, and that the arrests and imprison-
ments were illegal as a matter of law. The court said:
Liberty is at an end if a police officer may without warrant
arrest, not the person threatening violence, but those who are
its likely victims merely because the person arrested is engag-
ing in conduct which, though peaceful and legally and consti-
tutionally protected, is deemed offensive and provocative to
settled social customs and practices. 2
The court of appeals held that as a matter of law the defen-
dants had falsely imprisoned the plaintiffs and had deprived
them of constitutional rights to speak, associate, and be free
from illegal arrest, and remanded the case for determination of
damages. The court also reversed the jury verdict for defen-
dants on malicious prosecution and remanded for retrial.
"I The opinions highlight two relationships: judge-jury and trial court-appellate
court. This article concentrates on the former. Because of the procedural posture, the
appellate court technically passes on the trial court's decision on plaintiff's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
120 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1964).
,2, J. DOLLARD, CLASS AND CASTE IN A SOUTHERN TowN 351 (1957).
11 318 F.2d at 121.
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In Whirl v. Kern,23 Whirl was arrested, jailed, and in-
dicted. The court later dismissed the indictments, but someone
lost the documents. "Whirl languished in jail for almost nine
months after all charges against him were dismissed.' '1 4 Whirl
sued Sheriff Kern for false imprisonment and deprivation of
the constitutional right of liberty. The jury, finding Kern not
negligent, exonerated him. The court of appeals held that
Kern's "good faith" did not justify restraining Whirl unlaw-
fully:
Whirl, quasi-literate and one legged, languished in jail for
nine months after he was entitled to be free of his fetters.
Unfortunately, a non-malicious restraint is no sweeter than
restraint evilly motivated, and we cannot sanction chains
without legal justification even if they be forged by the hand
of an angel. . . A jury finding that a man's freedom is
worthless is clearly erroneous. It is an impossible judgment
to render against a sentient person, be he one legged, un-
schooled, friendless or without earning capacity.
12
The court of appeals held that the district court should have
directed a verdict for Whirl on both the Civil Rights Act and
common law false imprisonment claims. The case was re-
manded for a jury to determine damages.
In Anderson v. Nosser,121 the plaintiffs were arrested in
1965 while participating in a Natchez, Mississippi civil rights
march. Many of those arrested were sent to Parchman Peniten-
tiary where they "were subjected to sub-human treatment
which beggars justification and taxes credulity."' 1 They sued
the Natchez and Parchman officials charging false imprison-
ment, other state torts, and deprivation of their right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment. The jury returned a ver-
dict for defendants.
On appeal, the court held that as a matter of law the
defendants were liable to plaintiffs for deprivation of constitu-
tional rights and false imprisonment by failing to take them
' 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
124 Id. at 785.
I- Id. at 794-95, 798.
l2 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), modified en banc, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
1" 438 F.2d at 186.
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promptly before a magistrate. The court found that "the treat-
ment in the maximum security unit was totally unfounded
. . . .We deal with human beings, not dumb, driven cattle."
' s
The court left damages for trial on remand.
2
1
Finally, at Jackson State College in May 1970, sixty-nine
police and highway officers confronted several hundred unruly
black students. Officers heard a sound resembling a pistol shot;
and someone cried "sniper." Thirty-eight officers opened fire;
and bullets hit at lest fourteen black persons and killed two.
In Burton v. Waller' the plaintiffs sued the officers and their
supervisors for wrongful death and deprivation of constitu-
tional rights. The jury returned a verdict for all defendants.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court
should have directed a verdict for them. In this case, however,
the court of appeals affirmed. The jury, plaintiffs conceded,
could have found that a sniper caused the noise before the
barrage.' 3' While the barrage was excessive, the jury could have
concluded that individual police officers, fearing immediate
harm, fired either in self-defense or to suppress a riot.1 12 Al-
though some defendants fired negligently, the court refused to
direct a verdict against them because the plaintiffs lacked con-
clusive proof that these defendants actually caused their in-
jury.
33
The directed verdict guards the vital border between the
judge's and the jury's domain. A jury must be free to find facts;
but a judge must prevent a jury from circumventing the rule
of law. Courts and scholars cannot translate the twin policies
of jury freedom and obedience to the law into standards which
automatically determine when to direct a verdict. Reported
"I Id. at 193.
In Anderson v. Breazeale, 507 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1975); Anderson v. Robinson, 497
F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974). On rehearing en banc, the court affirmed the basic decision
but switched the legal basis of the Civil Rights Act theory from cruel and unusual
punishment to deprivation of due process through summary punishment, exonerated
the Natchez officials from paying for damage suffered at Parchman, and exonerated
the Parchman officials from damage in Natchez. Anderson v. Nasser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th
Cir. 1972).
'3 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975).
,3, Id. at 1269.
12 Id. at 1276.
"I Id. at 1282.
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opinions are written to support the result and are too pliable
for an observer to note anything but a clear departure from
conventional practice. But the constant reader of advance
sheets knows that these four decisions are exceptions to usual
jury submission practice.
These cases are partly explained by their factual simplic-
ity. A jury must credit a disinterested witness' uncontradicted,
unimpeached testimony."' In Anderson, Whirl, and Nesmith
the facts were undisputed. 3 A judge should not permit a jury
to ignore an interested witness' testimony which the opponent
could deny but does not."' In Anderson, defendants even stipu-
lated the damaging facts. 3 ' When, however, as in Burton v.
Waller, the defendant attacks the plaintiff's evidence even
slightly, the jury may believe either; and the court must accept
this jury's verdict for the defendant.
138
The legal doctrines also affect the result. In Nesmith,
Whirl and Anderson, the plaintiffs alleged intentional torts.
These torts protect the individual's interests in liberty and
bodily integrity; the standards may be relatively blunt and
inflexible. When the court decided Whirl, for example, the de-
fendant's good faith or intent to imprison was only an atten-
uated defense."' Changes in doctrine and differences between
doctrines affect the decision to submit a case to a jury. After
Whirl, the Supreme Court developed a qualified good faith
immunity defense for official defendants.4 This mixed objec-
tive and subjective standard will lead to more jury decisions
and make those decisions harder for judges to alter. As a result,
'' Cooper, supra note 16, at 928, 940.
'3 438 F.2d at 186; 407 F.2d at 785; 318 F.2d at 116.
I' Cooper, supra note 16, at 944. See also Gaines v. McGraw, 445 F.2d 393, 396
(5th Cir. 1971): "[A]lthough [defendants] here rely upon their 'good faith' as the
only defense to the right of the [plaintiff] to establish liability against them, there is
not a word in the record of the trial that indicates that Deputy Sheriff McGraw did
not know the Alabama law ..
PI 438 F.2d at 191-92.
'l See also Gaines v. McGraw, 445 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1971) (where the court
reversed a jury verdict for the defendant officer and entered a judgment for plaintiff
on liability); accord, Fults v. Pearsall, 408 F. Supp. 1164, 1167-78 (E.D. Tenn. 1975)
(testimony contrary to physical facts denied probative value).
"' 407 F.2d at 791.
'0 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974).
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an en banc Fifth Circuit modified Whirl by allowing a jailer
charged with false imprisonment to interpose a "reasonable
good faith" defense."' If plaintiff Whirl appealed today, the
court of appeals would probably affirm the jury's verdict for
Sheriff Kern.
The simplicity of intentional tort doctrine contrasts with
the subtle standards of negligence law. The jury relies on com-
mon experience and is more valuable when a legal standard,
like the prudent person standard, is part of their experience.
When negligence standards are at issue, the jury assumes a
more prominent role. The court of appeals began to stress caus-
ation and responsibility in the en banc rehearing in
Anderson.'42 This development resulted in the complex mixture
of negligence, causation, and responsibility in Burton v.
Wailer.'
The decisions of both the juries and courts have cultural
and political ingredients. Professor Cooper points out that
courts go to extreme lengths to submit FELA actions to the
jury,'44 but he argues that courts should "allow jury adjustment
of the law only in situations where the dangers of the more
common forms of prejudice are minimized."'4 5 The four law-
suits in this chapter emerged from the deep south's racial prob-
lems of the 1960's. They concerned basic interests-liberty and
bodily integrity-which society must protect. Defendants' as-
sertions of good faith often paled before violations of clear and
knowable constitutional rights.' Some actions are suited to
jury freedom, others to judicial control. Jurors seldom disbe-
lieve officials. Blacks and outsiders fare poorly before white,
southern juries. Personal deficiencies may blind any fact-
finder. As the court said about a similar lawsuit, "the jury
overcame its nobler instincts and turned its back on the law
' Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976).
142 Anderson v. Nasser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1972).
,' 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974).
' Cooper, supra note 16, at 924-27.
" Id. at 971.
,' Gaines v. McGraw, 445 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (official who knew or "reasonably should have known" that
particular act violates constitutional right may be liable); Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d
1210 (5th Cir. 1976).
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and the facts.' 4 7 Judges are trained to lay passion aside.14 8 The
judge's power to direct a verdict may ameliorate jury preju-
dice."4 Juries roam at will in FELA litigation. Nesmith, Whirl,
and Anderson, however, illustrate almost every attribute that
summons the judge to regulate the jury. To uphold plaintiffs'
constitutional rights and the rule of law, the court rejected the
juries' verdicts.
The Nesmith, Whirl, and Anderson courts directed ver-
dicts for plaintiff on liability, but remanded for a jury to pass
on damages. "What happens," Professor Carrington asks,
"when the next jury awards a verdict of $1?"I"0 In Louisiana,
an appellate court may reverse a jury verdict for the defendant
and enter judgment on liability with an appropriate award of
damages.'"' The Louisiana appellate courts' power to review
both law and facts does not violate the Constitution.'12 Judge
Wisdom equated the Louisiana and federal standards of fac-
tual review."' Thus in the lawsuits this chapter reviews, the
courts of appeals could have directed both a liability verdict
and an appropriate damage award. Instead, the courts chose an
"I Stewart v. Gilmore, 323 F.2d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 1963).
11 At the very least, judges must think about their decisions enough to draft
explicit factual findings which the appellate court can reverse if clearly inconsistent
with the record. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a). Jury verdicts are often only a general conclusion
which cannot be reviewed so thoroughly. Courts may, however, propound questions to
juries, and juries may return special verdicts. See, e.g., Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210,
1212 (5th Cir. 1976); FED. R. Crv. P. 49. Compare Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEx.
L. Rav. 273 (1955) with Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948).
U But see Cooper, supra note 16, at 954 n.167.
," p. CARRINGTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 272 (1969). In fact, a jury awarded 157
Anderson plaintiffs $500 apiece in compensatory damages against the superintendent
of Parchman Penitentiary. Anderson v. Breazeale, 507 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1975). See
also Anderson v. Robinson, 497 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974) ($5.00 per day against police
chief); SOUTHERN JUSTICE 55-56 (L. Freidman ed. 1967). Nesmith was settled for costs
on remand. In Whirl v. Kern, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover from the
defendant's surety, but the case is not further reported. 407 F.2d at 796. Where the
money would come from today is a conundrum in light of recent eleventh amendment
and federal jurisdiction decisions. See Warner v. Bd. of Trustees, 528 F.2d 505 (5th
Cir. 1976); Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976); Gates v.
Collier, 525 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1976); Newman v. Alabama, 522 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1975).
"I Johnson v. Horace Mann Mutual Ins. Co., 241 So. 2d 588 (La. Ct. App. 1970)
(student beaten brutally and without provocation by teacher).
,52 Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd on appeal,
409 U.S. 943 (1972).
'" Id. at 1048.
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intermediate and less activist way of accommodating jury free-
dom and plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
In civil cases, the judge tells the jury the law. The jury
reaches a verdict by determining the facts and by applying the
law to those facts. The Supreme Court expressed our romantic
ideal more than 100 years ago: "The merchant, the mechanic,
the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their
separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and
draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus
given it is the great effort of the law to obtain."1' 4 To achieve a
day in court before a jury instead of a judge, litigants must
surmount several barricades. In equity, a judge decides factual
questions.'55 Before a defamation case reaches trial, a judge
studies the evidence carefully. 55 When considering whether to
direct a verdict or to grant judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, a judge necessarily examines the facts. 5 The judge may
undertake the fact-finder's role, grant the defendant's pretrial
motion, or permit the plaintiff to win after the jury finds for
the defendant. While we formally defer to the jury, it often
appears as if we have successfully dissembled this deference
before practical application. The romantic ideal may not sur-
vive its collision with hard reality.
An ideological debate about the lay jury rings through
Anglo-American legal history.5 ' Defenders of the jury view it
as expressing a Rousseauian "collective earthy wisdom," a nat-
ural sense of fairness based on shared morality. Staunch believ-
ers in the jury emphasize the people, political freedom, citizen
participation in government, and the need to adjust the law's
harsh strictures to human realities.151 Scheflin defends a crimi-
nal jury's ability to acquit a defendant in the face of the law:
"u Sioux City & P. Ry. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 657, 664 (1874).
"= DOBBS, supra note 4 at 68; JAMES, supra note 4, at 338.
's' New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964).
"s Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1046 (E.D. La. 1972).
H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEIZEL, THE AMERICAN JuRy 3-9 (1966).
' ' See, e.g., Green, supra note 17, at 483; Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of
Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 166, 170 (1929).
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Thus, jury service is a two-way street. Community val-
ues are injected into the legal system making the application
of the law responsive to the needs of the people, and partici-
pation on the jury gives the people a feeling of greater in-
volvement in their government which further legitimizes that
government. This dual aspect of the concept of the jury, flow-
ing from its role as a political institution in a constitutional
democracy, serves to keep both the government and the peo-
ple in touch with each other. But should there be a divergence
of sufficient magnitude, as the Founding Fathers were aware
there often is, the jury can serve as a corrective with a final
veto power over judicial rigidity, servility or tyranny.'
Eminent scholars celebrate the civil jury's analoguous ability.
"Juries sometimes take the law into their own hands and de-
cide a case according to popular prejudice which often embod-
ies popular notions of what the law ought to be." This, accord-
ing to Professor James, is "a great strength of the jury sys-
tem." ' Roscoe Pound stated the same idea more strongly:
"Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual
administration."'' 2 Defenders of the civil jury should take their
stand on higher ground.
The jury limits government action. Bumble, one of Dick-
ens' autocratic villians, participated in this anti-jury harangue:
"'Juries' said Mr. Bumble, grasping his cane tightly, as was his
wont when working into a passion, 'juries is ineddicated, vul-
gar, grovelling wretches.' 'So they are,' said the undertaker.'2 3
Authoritarians like Bumble naturally fear the jury.6 4 The jury
is a political mechanism which may oppose particular applica-
tions of governmental power. In criminal prosecutions, a jury
with a tendency to acquit is a buffer between a citizen and the
state. In chapters one and three of this article, we see that a
civil jury may "acquit" governmental defendants, school offi-
cials and law enforcement officers. But this exonerates a gov-
ernment official who may have trampled citizens' constitu-
1" Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 168, 190
(1972).
"' James, Tort Law in Midstream, 8 BUFFALO L. REv. 315, 342-43 (1959).
"3 Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REV. 12, 18 (1910).
'3 C. DICKzSS, OLIVER TWIST, Ch. IV.
'" LoRD JusTIcE DEVLIN, TRIAL By JuRY 164 (1956).
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tional rights. Precisely because of the citizen's substantive
right, a judge may intercede on the citizen's side.
Detractors of the jury stress judicial expertise and intellec-
tual consistency.15 "To overrate the function of the jury (or
other trier of the facts)," Professor Griswold wrote, "is to shirk
the function of the court, and to fail to administer justice ra-
tionally, consistently, and soundly."'86 Detractors perceive the
argument for the jury to be ephemeral and illusory rhetoric, a
cloak for mean-spirited prejudice.' 7 They agree, however, that
the jury represents the community. A premise opposed to deci-
sions based on majority sentiment appears. What a jury ap-
proves or disapproves, a community approves or disapproves;
and the "town meeting"'68 may become a plebicite or, at worst,
a lynch mob.'66 Racial issues have proved particularly intracta-
ble, perhaps because "the concept of an impartial trial by one's
peers did not originate in a country containing visually distinct
racial and national groups one of which had not been the peers
but the slaves of the other."'70
The legal developments the three chapters describe are not
obviously wrong, yet they distort conventional jury procedure.
The results perplex both liberals and conservatives. Despite
the seventh amendment's clear language, rules intended to
allow a judge to regulate a civil jury have, as Judge Wisdom
observed, a "plastic nature."' 7 ' Can we cherish jury "equity"
in personal injury actions for cripples, widows, and orphans but
withhold it from prejudiced school boards, libeled public per-
sons, and Dixie sheriffs?'72
Policymakers designed the courtroom ritual to suspend
prejudgment, but sometimes it fails to work. The question is
simple: When will the judge permit the jury to ignore or alter
,"5 JAMES, supra note 4, at 240-41. See also L. JAFFE, JuDicIL CONTROL OF ADMINIS-
TRA7rVE ACTION 90 (1965).
"I Griswold, The Supreme Court 1959 Term, Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes
-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 89 (1960).
"7 See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 173-78 (1930); Kane, supra note
4, at 35 n.144.
2,8 Anderson v. Robinson, 497 F.2d 120, 121 (5th Cir. 1974).
' Moore, Redressing the Balance, TaiAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 31.
, Id. at 29.
"' Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1047 (E.D. La. 1972).
,7 Redish, supra note 6, at 508.
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the law? The question can be stated another way: What values
do judges think are too important to expose to possible jury
prejudice? The substantive legal issue, we discover, is relevant
to formulating the jury's role, submission practice, and jury
regulation. As all three chapters reveal, it helps to be a consti-
tutional litigant. 73 In addition, racial tensions permeate chap-
ters one and three, and the immunity in chapter two originated
from a white Alabama jury's $500,000 libel verdict against an
out-of-state newspaper and several civil rights leaders for an
advertisement to solicit money for racial equality. 174
Practical questions about the jury's role cut to the core of
the type of society we desire to create and maintain. In a plur-
alistic society, tension, change, and conflict are inevitable. The
adjudicatory process simply reflects society. Contemporary
jury issues grow out of present contrdversies. In a complex,
pluralistic, and law-laden society, a civil jury as a miniature
legislature may soften the substantive law's impact, 17 but we
purport to be governed by a democratically elected legislature
and to live under a judicially construed constitution. Serious
questions arise when a jury, or even one juror, creates regional
or individual variations in substantive law developed by courts
and legislatures.1 76 To ensure that litigants receive their just
desserts, must the process appear capricious, arbitrary, and
irresponsible?
The civil jury, finally, reflects a fundamental paradox be-
tween authority delegated and authority retained. Ultimate
sovereignty resides in the people. In the end, those who look
only to results must yield to process values. Juries prevent
legalisms from vanquishing justice. The civil jury survives, tar-
nished but sentient. Within a constitutional framework, offi-
cials possess delegated authority. Constitutional government
ensures that to the extent possible, people and officials live by
the rule of law instead of the rule of a person or group of per-
sons. Judges protect the Constitution from the people. To limit
," See also McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Mo. 1975) (submission of
obscenity issue).
171 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
171 Norton, What a Jury Is, 16 VA. L. REV. 261, 262-63 (1930).
,I" J. FANK, COURTS ON TAIL 127-35 (Princeton ed. 1973); Simpson, Jury Nullifi-
cation in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. Rav. 488, 511-14 (1976).
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the government, we divide its power with the jury, but the jury
may exercise that power irresponsibly. Litigants seek, in par-
ticular courtrooms, to secure benefits of substantive rights to
which all have an equal but abstract claim. The judge exercises
delegated authority; the jury represents retained authority.
The courtroom unites dour elitism and zealous populism in
intrinsic discord.
